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ABSTRACT 
 
What is the relationship between democracy and taxation, under conditions of ‘reverse’ sequencing?  
Existing theories about taxation and democracy have presumed this relationship to be positive, but 
they have largely been predicated on the West’s historical evolution where the state became strong 
before it became democratic.  The ‘reverse’ sequencing most developing countries are experiencing 
– democratizing before they consolidate their statehood – may have important implications for 
their ability to tax.  The paper argues that taxing in a context of weak state capacity necessitates 
state-building with intrinsically coercive elements, as citizens have few incentives to voluntarily 
comply. The paper hypothesizes that democracy reduces the ability of the state to coerce and that 
this has implications for how it can tax.   The empirical section uses a most similar systems design 
to compare a democracy, Lesotho, with an autocracy, Rwanda, demonstrating how the mechanics 
of this process operate: how governments incentivize bureaucracies into certain kinds of tax 
collection, depending on regime type; how this then affects the different levels of state-building 
activities the tax authority engages in; and how this cumulatively impacts on tax outcomes.   
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Introduction 
Research on the relationship between democracy and taxation has yielded some of the most rich 
theoretical insights within political science.  Raising tax has been shown to create a fiscal contract 
between citizens and state, mirroring the democratic compact and giving it substance.  The idea 
that tax gives citizens a degree of power over their rulers, and a chip with which to bargain, is 
deeply embedded.  Tax is thought to lead to demands for democracy, and democracy to legitimate 
and enhance the efficiency of tax collection.  They are seen to be mutually reinforcing processes.   
Although the historical evolution of Western states has provided ample empirical evidence to 
support the positive relationship between democracy and taxation, recent work has produced 
ambiguous results.  A number of quantitative studies have sought to establish the impact of regime 
type on taxation using a sample of developed and developing countries, but they have found 
contradictory results (Cheibub, 1998; Fauvelle-Aymer, 1999; Boix, 2001; Thies, 2004; Ross, 2004).  
This lack of empirical confirmation constitutes the puzzle this paper tries to address: why is there 
so little evidence for a positive impact between democracy and taxation today? 
One of the reasons why this critical relationship may not be operating as we expect could derive 
from the fact that most developing countries are currently experiencing a process of ‘reverse’ 
development.    A number of authors have pointed out the fact that developing countries today are 
democratizing before they consolidate their statehood, and hence are following a ‘reverse’ 
institutional sequence to the one which unfolded in the West, with implications for outcomes 
(Huntington, 1968; Mansfield & Snyder, 2007; Fukuyama, 2007).  The importance of the timing of 
democracy in state-building has so far received little analytical attention, especially in research on 
the relationship between democracy and taxation.  This prompts the key research question 
addressed in this paper: What is the relationship between democracy and taxation, under conditions 
of ’reverse’ sequencing?   
In trying to answer this question the paper draws on a central insight of the sequencing argument, 
by seeing taxation firstly as a function of state-building and only latterly as a function of state 
society relations.  In a developing world context, where states are generally weak and the tax net 
small, citizens have few incentives to voluntarily comply, as free-riding is easy and the services 
received in return are poor. As this is the case, the state must first acquire the coercive capacity to 
force everyone to pay before it can convince them to do so consensually.  When taxation is seen in 
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this way, as being firstly about extending the reach and control of the state, it becomes clear that 
democracy, which gives citizens a greater capacity to resist these processes, may have an important 
impact on taxation, though not the positive one that we have come to expect.   The paper 
hypothesizes that democracy reduces the ability of the state to coerce and that this has implications 
for how it can tax.    
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section gives an overview of the existing literature on the 
relationship between democracy and taxation.  It emphasizes how this literature, mostly predicated 
on the West’s historical experience, has predominantly seen taxation as a function of state-society 
relations, rather than state-building.  The next section advances an initial theoretical discussion of 
how democracy might impact on the mechanics of tax collection, under conditions of reverse 
sequencing.  It argues that democracies seek to maximize tax collection, with minimal coercive 
state-building.  The empirical part of the paper presents a comparison between one democratic 
African state, Lesotho, and one autocratic one, Rwanda, to show how differences in regime type 
impact on the operations of tax authorities and resulting tax outcomes.  The paper concludes by 
considering the implications of the findings.  
 
Democracy and Taxation 
The existing literature on democracy and taxation has primarily considered one direction of 
causality – that from taxation to democracy – and done so on the basis of the historical trajectory 
of countries in the West.  Tilly traced the origin of the revenue imperative, and the development of 
the state, to the need to go to war (Tilly, 1992).  Rulers, needing revenue to fight, had to raise tax, 
which necessitated the construction of the extractive infrastructure of the state.  Brewer showed 
exactly how the need to collect tax led to the expansion of state capacity in early modern Britain, as 
the King began developing a Weberian bureaucracy in order to collect excise taxes (Brewer, 1988).  
This expansion of power increasingly brought the state into conflict with citizens, who demanded 
concessions, in the form of representation and services, in return for taxation.  They wanted a say 
in how their money was spent and how this emerging bureaucratic power related to them.  The link 
from taxation to representation has been clearly theoretically explored through these historical 
processes, and neatly summed up in the demands of American revolutionaries that there be ‘no 
taxation without representation’. 
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Useful as this literature is in outlining the mutually constitutive character of taxation and state-
building, the relationship between these variables and representation is embedded in a particular 
historical trajectory of institutional sequencing followed by states in the West, but arguably very 
different from that being followed by developing countries today.  As a number of authors have 
noted, most states in the developing world are following this sequence in reverse: they are 
democratizing before they have fully consolidated their statehood (Huntington, 1968; Mansfield & 
Snyder, 2007; Fukuyama, 2007).  While in the West the emergence of representative institutions 
were in many ways a response to the expansion of the state, both in bureaucratic and fiscal terms, 
and so came after, many developing countries are democratizing first, before they have constructed 
‘an orderly administrative powerbase’ (Mansfield & Snyder, 2007, p. 59).  This sequencing prompts 
questions about the reverse causality – from representation to taxation.   
 
Many authors have argued for a positive relationship between tax and democracy as they have seen 
tax as a function of state-society relations.  The existence of a fiscal bargain at the heart of the 
relationship between citizens and rulers has been demonstrated in cross country regression analysis 
(Ross, 2004); using citizen surveys (Fjeldstad, 2004); and experimental methods (Cummings et al, 
2005).  As democracy alters state-society relations, and taxation is a function of this relationship, it 
is hypothesized that democracy should have an effect on tax outcomes.  Since the changes wrought 
on state-society relations by democracy are positive – opening political space for opposition, giving 
citizens more voice, creating mechanisms of accountability, and placing constraints on rulers - its 
impact on taxation should also be positive.  It should, as Levi argues, reduce the transaction costs 
of taxing by making compliance ‘quasi voluntary’ and by building ‘tax morale’ (Levi, 1988; 
Pommerehne, Hart & Frey 1994).  Citizens should be more willing to enter into a fiscal contract 
with the state, as they have more control over its actions and greater belief in its legitimacy (Levi, 
Sacks & Tyler, 2009).   
 
However, the theoretical case for a positive relationship between tax and democracy has not 
received emphatic empirical confirmation.  A number of quantitative studies have sought to 
establish the effect of regime time on the overall level of taxation.  In one of the earliest studies, 
Cheibub found no significant evidence that regime type had any effect (Cheibub, 1998).  A later 
study focused only on developing countries, found that democracies were better at taxing (Thies, 
2004), while another found the opposite result (Fauvelle-Aymer, 1999).  Boix did find support for 
the suggestions that democracies tax more, but only for countries above a certain income threshold 
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(Boix, 2001).  The empirical literature provides no clear answer on what the relationship between 
democracy and taxation is, but confirms that a straightforward positive relationship cannot be 
assumed. 
 
Emerging qualitative evidence from contemporary developing world contexts also raises questions 
about the assumption that working out a fiscal contract either necessitates democracy, or that 
increased taxation is always the outcome of democratic bargaining.  As Bernstein and Lu have 
shown, increases in local taxes in China sparked protests that led to changes in how local 
government operated and the abolition of certain forms of tax, but within the context of an 
autocratic state (Bernstein & Lu, 2008).  In East Africa, onerous local taxes, in a context where 
democratic opening had created an increased space for mobilization, sparked protests that led to 
the abolition of controversial poll taxes (Fjeldtad & Therkildsen, 2008).  In this example, the 
positive changes brought about in state-society relations by the emergence of democratic 
institutions had a negative impact on tax outcomes.  Rather than strengthening the fiscal contract, it 
enabled people to opt out of it altogether. 
 
At both the macro and micro level there is a paucity of evidence to support the contention that 
democracy has a straightforwardly positive impact on taxation.  This is theoretically surprising to 
those who have seen taxation as a function of state society relations.  However, this result is more 
understandable if taxation is seen as, primarily, a function of state-building.  The literature on the 
evolution of the West emphasizes how taxation firstly led to state-building, and only secondly – as 
the state became more powerful – to improved state-society relations.  In accentuating how 
democracy leads to ‘voluntary’ aspects of compliance, existing accounts often skim over the fact 
that it is still ‘quasi-voluntary’.  The capacity to force citizens to pay still lies at the bottom of the 
fiscal contract.  This is even more the case in developing countries, where most people are outside 
the tax net, and the compliance issue is about bringing them within the net, and into the control of 
the state. 
 
This paper attempts to address the lacunae in the existing literature in a number of ways.  Firstly, 
most studies on the relationship between democracy and taxation have downplayed the role of 
state-building in taxation and consequently paid little attention to the tax authority as a key actor in 
this process.  They have focused on rulers, and their motivations; societies, and their cleavages; and 
the relations between the two.  Secondly, as a result of leaving out the bureaucratic institutions, and 
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seeing taxation primarily as a function of state-society relations, they have overlooked the 
mechanics of what you must do to collect tax, and so too the character of that process – as 
inherently coercive and often conflictual.  Thirdly, they have been primarily concerned with the 
overall levels of taxation – how much tax is collected - rather than its structure – where tax is being 
derived from.  This paper attempts to address these weaknesses by focusing specifically on how 
democracy impacts on the way in which tax authorities go about the process of collecting tax and 
how this then maps onto the overall structure of taxation that result.  The next section outlines the 
main theoretical arguments. 
 
Taxation and the Political Constraints on State-building  
In order for a tax authority to be able to collect tax from its citizens it must; know who is eligible to 
pay tax; register them; ensure they know how to pay; secure the borders – both external and 
internal – so no one can slip through the net; acquire the capacity to monitor and enforce 
compliance.  In other words, they need to consolidate their knowledge of and control over citizens.  
It is not coincidental that we use the term ‘tax net’: to function effectively, the tax authority must 
have the ability to catch people and must be able to minimize their chances of escape. 
 
These tasks, the mechanics of tax collection, are very challenging in a developing world context, not 
only because of a context of underdeveloped economies, but also unconsolidated statehood.  The 
low reach of the state, and its inability to broadcast power, has been singled out as one of the key 
characteristics of weak states (Herbst, 2000).  Large territories, with low population densities, long 
and porous borders, and very large informal sectors, means that the ‘net’, in a developing world 
context, has many holes, and bringing people within it is a significant challenge.  This results in a 
situation where only a tiny fraction of the population is actually registered with the tax authority.  In 
Namibia, for example, there are 200,000 individuals and 15,000 companies registered to pay tax, 
which is a relatively high figure compared to other less developed African countries, but less than 
10% of the Namibian population (Hansohm, Schade & Nephembe, 2002).   
  
In this context, where states are weak and the tax net small, citizens have few incentives to pay tax.  
On the tax side of the fiscal contract, the fact that so few people are within the tax net and the state 
has a low ability to enforce compliance, means the opportunities to free-ride will be high.  Rational 
individuals will therefore choose not to pay (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972).  On the services side of 
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contract, a poor capacity state has a lower ability to deliver effective services in return for taxation.  
Again, a rational individual will try to avoid paying tax and instead seek services in the private 
sector.  On both sides of the equation, then, poor capacity states are trapped in a low efficiency 
equilibrium where the incentives to pay tax are very low.   
 
Seeing tax in these terms – as a classic collective action problem – highlights how the route to 
revenue raising is through state-building: the state must first have the ability to coerce everyone to 
pay, before it can convince them to do so consensually.  In this sense, the collection of taxes in 
developing countries is not ‘quasi voluntary’ but rather ‘quasi coercive’ and the key task of the 
revenue authority is as much to extend the control of the state as it is just to collect taxes. 
 
This paper hypothesizes that democracy reduces the ability of the state to coerce and extend its 
control by increasing the ability of citizens to resist these processes.  If you increase the ability of 
citizens living in such a low capacity state to bargain over tax, the rational choice for them is not to 
negotiate how much tax to pay, but rather to choose not to pay at all.  Democracy increases the 
space for citizens to bargain with the state:  improvements in civil liberties enable protest and 
contestation; competitive elections make politicians responsive to the preferences of voters; 
constraints on the executive curtail the power of the state.  If they have a greater ability to bargain, 
but cannot trust the state to have the power to make everyone pay then, regardless of the state’s 
own character, they have few incentives to consent and more to resist or opt out completely.  
 
The advent of democracy before states have consolidated their ability to control will then have 
serious implications for how that state can collect tax.  Governments in democracies will be more 
constrained in their ability to target taxes that are more politically sensitive and that involve higher 
degrees of state-building.  In other words, their preference will be to maximize tax collection, with 
minimal state building.  Governments in autocracies will face lower constraints in undertaking 
state-building activities, and in fact may even have incentives to do so.  They can maximize tax 
collection, with maximum state-building. 
 
If these are the political realities that governments face, how do they transfer these incentives and 
constraints to the tax authority?  Much of the existing literature assumes that this is an automatic 
process, where the bureaucracy is the agent of government, directly translating their will into reality.  
This paper does not make that assumption.  Instead it proposes that, although most tax authorities 
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are nominally autonomous from the rest of the civil service (Fjeldstad & Moore, 2009), 
governments have devised ways to incentivize them into specific modes of tax collection.  As well 
as the ad hoc interference by governments to use tax authorities to reward allies and harass 
opponents that has been noted in some countries (Therkildsen, 2004), governments take long-term 
measures to inscribe their own objectives into the incentive structures within which revenue 
authorities operate.  Democracies design incentive structures to constrain the state-building 
impulses of revenue authorities, and autocracies design ones to enable it.  Although they are not 
straightforward puppets, tax authorities are malleable, especially in the early years after their 
establishment, and governments in both democracies and autocracies mould them towards their 
own ends. 
 
If governments have effectively transferred the constraints they face in engaging in coercive state-
building to tax authorities, then they should be observed to be taxing in different ways.  Tax 
authorities in autocracies should be observed to be more aggressively active in expanding the reach 
of the state; controlling borders; expanding operations into the periphery; penetrating the informal 
sector; setting up capable enforcement mechanisms – in both auditing and prosecution; increasing 
taxpayer registration; and using taxpayer education as a tool of broader state-building projects. Tax 
authorities in democracies should be observed to be less active in these activities, and more focused 
on extracting the maximum revenue from the least politically sensitive areas. 
 
These operational differences should also then map onto differences in overall tax structure.  Some 
forms of taxation, such as direct taxation need more intensive state-building activities.  Indirect 
taxes also require high levels of activity, especially where there are multitudes of small businesses, 
often with poor literacy and book keeping capabilities.  These are also the most politically sensitive 
kinds of taxation as both are highly visiblei.  In contrast, taxes on trade, natural resources or 
tourism, for example, are not as visible to citizens, and they are more ‘lootable’ – they require less 
intensive state-building efforts.  Putting these pieces together it should be the case that democracies 
will try to maximize revenue collection from the least politically sensitive taxes and will have a 
lower ability to change their tax structure over time towards direct and indirect taxes.  Autocracies 
will not be similarly constrained and can maximize revenue across tax types and change the tax 
structure over time.  
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TABLE ONE: SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL ARGUMENT 
 Democracies Autocracies 
Ability to engage in coercive state-
building 
 
Lower Higher 
Incentive Structures Designed to constrain state-building Designed to enable state building 
Observable Indicators Less aggressive taxpayer recruitment 
Lower penetration of the informal sector 
Lower efforts to extend reach into the 
periphery 
Weak enforcement mechanisms 
 
More aggressive taxpayer recruitment 
Higher penetration of informal sector 
Higher efforts to extend reach into the 
periphery 
Clear enforcement mechanisms 
Impact on Tax Structure & Levels Higher dependence on ‘lootable’ taxes 
Lower rates of increase in direct and 
indirect taxes 
Lower dependence on ‘lootable’ taxes 
Higher rates of increase in direct and 
indirect taxes 
 
Table One summarizes the theoretical propositions thus far.  Democracies have a lower ability to 
engage in coercive state-building than autocracies. Governments consequently create incentive 
structures for Tax Authorities designed to to either constrain or enable state-building.   These 
different incentives then create different kinds of operational behavior: Tax Authorities in 
democracies can be observed to be engaging in less coercive state-building than democracies, as 
measured by the indicators listed below.  This cumulatively has an effect on tax outcomes, creating 
higher dependence on ‘lootable’ taxes and lower rates of increase in direct taxes in democracies 
than in autocracies.  The next section uses this table the template for testing the propositions put 
forward with a case comparison of Rwanda and Lesotho. 
 
Revenue Authorities and State-building: Comparing Rwanda and 
Lesotho 
 
To test the effect of democracy on how tax authorities operate and resulting tax outcomes, the 
empirical section of the paper uses a ‘most similar systems’ comparison between Rwanda and 
Lesotho (George & Bennet 2005; Tarrow 2010).  The claim that these two countries are most 
similar requires some justification.  The following section compares Rwanda and Lesotho in terms 
of key economic, administrative and political variables to show that, in as much as possible, they are 
similar in terms of the usual explanations of tax structure and collection, and different in terms of 
the key political variable of interest – levels of democracy.  
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Both Rwanda and Lesotho are small, landlocked African countries that are broadly comparable in 
terms of the size and structure of their economy.  Their GDP per capita, US$334 and US$470, 
mean that both countries are classified by the World Bank as Least Developed Countries.  They are 
also broadly comparable in terms of employment diversity and sectoral structure, although Lesotho 
is somewhat more diversified.  In Rwanda in 1989, 90% of the population was employed in 
agriculture, 3% in industry and 7% in servicesii.  In Lesotho in 1999, 72% of the population was 
employed in agriculture, 9% in industry and 18% in services.  Although there is an 18% difference 
between the two countries, in both cases it is clear that the great majority of people are employed in 
agriculture.  Neither country has significant natural resources.  However, there is a very big 
difference in terms of levels of trade.  Lesotho is over three times as reliant on trade as Rwanda.  
The implications of this are discussed further in footnote 11.  At this point, it is fair to say that 
Rwanda and Lesotho are broadly comparable in terms of the size and structure of their economies, 
other than the fact that Lesotho has much greater levels of trade. 
 
Other variables matter for taxation, particularly how the tax authority is organized.  Both the LRA 
and the RRA are autonomous revenue authorities, established within the last fifteen years: the RRA 
was set up in 1998 and the LRA in 2003.  They both have very similar governance structures and 
internal organization.  This, in a large part, reflects the diffusion of best practices and New Public 
Management principles throughout the newly established tax authorities in Africa (Fjeldstad & 
Moore, 2009; Hirschman, 2011), and is a result of the fact that both have received significant 
financial and technical support from DfID.  These factors combined mean that the administrative 
structure of both authorities is very similar.  They both have a board of governors composed of 
four representatives from the relevant ministries, three representatives from the private sector, and 
one from the central bank.  They have both reformed their internal operational structure to 
conform more closely to the international norms, with departments based on functions rather than 
tax heads.   
 
Rwanda and Lesotho may be broadly comparable in terms of economic and administrative 
variables.  Where they do differ significantly is in terms of the key independent variable of interest: 
regime type.  Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy, deemed by Freedom House to be ‘partly free’ 
and with a Polity IV score of 8.  Democracy in Lesotho is far from fully institutionalized, and has 
not delivered a change in government, but elections are regularly held, are deemed free and fair, and 
the opposition is strong and active.  The aspects of democracy that matter for the theoretical 
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argument, electoral competition and civil liberties, are present.  Rwanda is a presidential republic, 
classified by Freedom House as ‘not free’, and with a Polity IV score of -4.  Since the Genocide, 
Rwanda has been ruled by the Rwandan Patriotic Forceiii.  All other serious opposition parties have 
been banned, opposition candidates arrested and even, in one case, assassinated (Freedom House, 
2010).  Although elections are regularly held, the widespread suppression of the opposition means 
that Rwanda is very far from democratic.   
 
The empirical analysis which follows assesses the extent to which these differences in political 
institutions have impacted on how the tax authorities go about collecting tax.  It begins by showing 
how governments incentivize bureaucracies into certain kinds of tax collection, depending on 
regime type; then demonstrates the ways in which this affects the different levels of state-building 
activities the tax authority engages in; finally it shows and how this cumulatively impacts on tax 
outcomes.   Within each section the analysis triangulates evidence from interviews with senior 
officials and experts, in both the RRA and LRA, conducted in 2009, with detailed process tracing 
using primary documents, most particularly the annual reports of both authorities, as well as 
independent evaluations.   
 
Explaining Different Levels of State-Building: The Incentive 
Structures of Revenue Authorities 
 
Both the Rwandan and Lesothan governments have created incentive structures for their revenue 
authorities that bring these institution’s objectives in line with their own.  In Lesotho, where the 
government has been anxious to maximize revenue collection, while minimizing coercive state-
building, the LRA has been incentivized away from collecting taxes in the more politically sensitive 
area of direct taxes and VAT, and into relying heavily on trade taxes.  In Rwanda, the government 
has the objective of maximizing revenue collection with maximum state-building, and has 
incentivized the RRA into maximizing revenue collection across tax types, rather than solely by 
focusing on the most lucrative tax handles, such as large taxpayers or trade taxes.  The incentive 
structures can be seen at both the macro level, the incentives of the institution as a whole, and the 
micro level, the incentives of individual officials. 
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The key tool used by governments at the macro level to mould incentive structures has been the 
issue of how the revenue authority is funded.  In Lesotho, in the initial years after the LRA’s 
foundation in 2003, a clear tension was evident between the government and the LRA over how 
the Authority would be funded.  The government’s preference was for the funding to come from 
the central budget and to be based on the estimates of overall tax collection, which were voted on 
by parliament.  The Authority, however, wanted to be funded in a different way; retaining an agreed 
percentage of direct and indirect tax collections: ‘a long term funding mechanism which is based 
solely on a percentage of the Income Tax and VAT remittances that are generated by the Authority 
is preferred by both the Ministry and the LRA’ (LRA, 2005, p. 7).  Unlike the government, the LRA 
wanted their funding to be based on what they actually collected, rather than estimates, and on 
direct rather than total tax take. 
 
The rationale for this preference was clearly stated: ‘it is important to ensure that, for the future, the 
Authority is incentivized to maximize income tax and VAT collection efforts and, by extension, 
recoup its own share of such revenue’ (LRA, 2005, p. 8).  The LRA was worried about the high 
dependence on trade taxes and in particular the annual remittance they received from the Southern 
Africa Customs Union (SACU).  Under the terms of SACU, Lesotho received a share of all the 
trade taxes collected in the customs area union, determined by a revenue sharing formula that was 
not based on the actual amounts of tax which they collectediv.  However, the terms of the formula 
changed after 2005 to be more directly based on actual collections.  This was anticipated to lead to 
a drop in the remittance, as it was a measure designed to boost trade liberalization in the region.  
The LRA expressed persistent concerns about the very high levels of dependence on SACU: in 
2008 the annual report stated that any change in the remittance would require a ‘greater than 
proportionate increase in collections from other sources of revenue to offset it’ (LRA, 2008, p. 17).  
They wanted to be specifically incentivized into the collection of direct and indirect taxes, in a way 
that would enable them to change the tax structure.  They expressed the hope that the issue would 
be resolved by 2006/7. 
 
However, by 2006, the issue was still unresolved.  The Authority seemed to have realized that their 
call for a switch from funding based on estimates to a retention fee had no traction with the 
government.  They switched to calling for their budget to be based on estimates, but only those for 
direct and indirect taxes: ‘it is hoped that from 2006/7 onwards the Authority will receive an 
equivalent amount of funding but based solely on the estimates of Income Tax and VAT collection’ 
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(LRA, 2006, p. 25).  Although a weaker incentivizing strategy than a retention fee, the Authority 
was again asking to be allowed to focus more on direct and indirect taxes. 
 
These requests were never realized.  From the 2007/8 Annual Report onwards, there was no 
further mention of the funding issue.  The LRA continued to be funded on the basis of overall 
estimates of total tax revenue, rather than actual collections of direct taxes.  The government had 
rejected their preference to be incentivized both into increased general revenue collection, by 
allowing them to keep some of the revenue collected, and into changing the tax structure, by 
focusing on direct and indirect taxes. 
 
The situation in Lesotho contrasts markedly with that in Rwanda.  From 2003 onwards, the RRA 
was funded from a retention fee of 2.6% of total revenue collected.  The Authority credited this 
with having ‘significantly increased the RRA’s operational efficiency’ (RRA, 2005, p. 3).  In 2005 
they asked for the percentage to be increased and in 2007 the cabinet sanctioned an increase to 
3.5%.  The RRA, in contrast to the LRA, has been directly incentivized into increasing tax 
collection in all tax categories. 
 
In Rwanda, at the micro level, individuals within the RRA have been incentivized collectively into 
attaining the RRA’s overall revenue targets.  All RRA staff members receive a bonus when the total 
revenue collected is in excess of the targets agreed by the Ministry of Finance (ADB, 2010).  This 
bonus can amount to as much as 80-100% of their salaries.  Given that everyone has a strong 
incentive to ensure that the targets will be met, constant monitoring processes are in place to 
achieve that end.  Weekly departmental meetings are held to ensure that targets will be reached and 
to devise corrective action if not: ‘the key purpose of the monitoring process was to identify any 
instances where targets weren’t being met and then identify corrective action that is needed to get 
back on track’ (RRA, 2005, p. 22). 
 
The incentive structure at the micro level within the RRA is based on a collective principle: when 
the organization as a whole meets its revenue targets, everyone benefits.  Officials are not assessed 
on their individual revenue raising capabilities, meaning that there are no incentives to concentrate 
solely on large and lucrative taxpayers to get big revenue wins (FIAS, 2006a, p. 87).  The structure 
of incentives ensures that the RRA can balance both its revenue maximizing and state-building 
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functions; it incentives staff to collectively meet revenue targets, but not at the expense of other 
objectives, such as widening the tax net into the less lucrative informal sector.   
 
The LRA, by contrast, does not have a micro incentive structure that rewards all staff for meeting 
overall revenue targets.  Instead, it has individual targets focused on particular kinds of tax.  The 
Performance Management Development System (PMDS), was introduced in 2004/5, and linked 
personal performance indicators to set revenue collection targets for individual staff members, but 
only those in customs units on the borders.  Ensuring that staff were maximizing and accurately 
recording customs revenue transactions had become particularly important after 2004, as the SACU 
revenue sharing formula changed to being more specifically based on actual recorded collections.  
When the PMDS was rolled out to the whole Authority in 2007/8, individual indicators were not 
linked to revenue collection but with the LRAs broad objectives which, as discussed below, had 
been steadily moving away from a narrow focus on revenue collection and towards voluntary 
compliance. 
 
The difference in macro and micro level incentive structures can clearly be seen to have an effect 
on how each authority behaves.  The LRA, at the macro level, is incentivized to exaggerate its 
estimated revenue collection, as its funding is a proportion of these estimates.  It is not incentivized 
to actually meet them.  From 2003 to 2008 the LRA missed its targets once, and met it three times, 
but on two occasions this was after the targets had been revised to a lower level.  When targets 
have been exceeded it has been by a margin of between .4 and 12% (LRA, 2009, p. 7).  By contrast, 
the RRA is incentivized at the macro level to set low targets, as staff members receive a bonus if the 
target is exceeded, and to exceed it by as much as possible, as the overall budget is based on actual 
revenue collected.  The RRA has exceeded its targets every year since 2000, by a margin of between 
5 and 25%.   
 
Each government has incentivized its tax authority into modes of revenue collection that mirror its 
own political imperatives and constraints.  The democratic government in Lesotho has provided no 
incentives for the LRA to move away from relying on ‘lootable’ trade taxes and towards increasing 
politically sensitive direct taxes.  At the micro level, there is no collective incentive to staff to 
maximize revenue, except in one area – customs.  In Rwanda, the government has not been so 
constrained and has incentivized the RRA into maximizing tax collection across tax types.  How 
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these differences in incentive structure affect the different levels of state-building activities the tax 
authority engages in, is the subject of the next section.   
 
The Mechanics of Tax Collection: Differences in Operations 
There are clear differences between the LRA and the RRA in terms of their stated commitment to, 
and operational use of tax for the task of state-building.  The RRA has explicitly listed widening the 
tax net as one of its strategic objectives; consistently linked taxation to broader projects of 
development in the creation of its public image and their actions; targeted the informal sector; 
extended their reach into the periphery; and established clear enforcement mechanisms.  In contrast 
to this, the LRA has shifted away from the goal of widening the tax net towards voluntary 
compliance; undertaken few activities in targeting the informal sector; done little to extend their 
reach into the periphery; and failed to establish strong enforcement mechanisms.   
 
The LRA’s emphasis on the state-building aspects of their operations has steadily decreased over 
time.  While in the first two years after their foundation, widening the tax net was listed as one the 
five key strategic objectives in their Annual Report, this was dropped in subsequent reports.  The 
move away from this aspect of their role accelerated after an organizational review in 2007, when 
the LRA adopted a new direction that focused on ‘promoting voluntary compliance as opposed to 
rigorous enforcement strategies that had a detrimental effect on taxpayers perceptions about the 
role of the LRA’ (LRA, 2009, p. 4).  The emphasis on voluntary compliance, ensuring that those 
already registered were compliant, was allied to a de-emphasis on increasing the number of people 
registered and widening the tax net.   
 
This shift away from the state-building aspects of tax collection was made explicit in October 2007, 
where the LRA changed their motto from ‘Pay Taxes and Build Lesotho’s Future’ to ‘Serving You, 
Serving the Nation’.  The move was seen to ‘reflect the Authority’s strategic focus on the provision 
of a facilitative service, rather than focusing solely on the collection of revenue’ (LRA, 2008, p. 22).  
The Authority was attempting to decouple taxation, in the minds of taxpayers, from the broader 
project of national development, and instead emphasizing its responsive, service orientated 
approach to its task, in which tax payers were seen primarily as clients rather than citizens. 
 
  17 
In Rwanda, by contrast, the RRA has continued to explicitly link taxation to the tasks of state-
building and national development.  Every year the RRA holds ‘National Taxpayers Day’ when the 
largest compliant taxpayers are honoured publicallyv.  This Day is one of the two most important 
public events of the year that is always attended by the President (ADB, 2010).  As the themes of 
the Day demonstrate, the RRA consistently tries to draw a link between taxation and national and 
economic development; ‘Be a compliant taxpayer, build you nation’ (2008); ‘Partnership for 
business growth’ (2009); ‘Choose development, be compliant’ (2010).  
 
This difference in the stated objectives and symbolic language which the two Authorities use, maps 
onto significant differences in the concrete actions they have taken in relation to extending the tax 
net into the informal sector, penetrating the periphery and establishing enforcement mechanisms. 
 
Bringing more and more of the informal sector into the tax net has been one of the core objectives 
of the RRA.  A World Bank survey of the informal sector in 2004 noted that of the estimated 
70,000 micro and small enterprises in Rwanda, only 1000 of these were registered with the RRA 
(RPSF, 2005).  In their 2005 Annual Report, the RRA listed this situation as being one of their 
major constraints, as it ‘dwarfs the registered formal business activities and narrows the tax base’ 
and because ‘in spite of our rigorous pursuits in taxpayer identification and registration throughout 
the year, many potential taxpayers remain outside the tax net’ (RRA, 2006, p. 24).   
 
Specific policies to tackle registration and compliance in the informal sector emerged in 2008.  RRA 
launched the Block Management System (BMS), under which Kigali was divided into blocks and 
sub-blocks, and revenue officials went door-to-door checking that all businesses eligible to pay tax 
were registered with the Authority.  The explicit aim of the BMS was to ‘widen the tax base by 
reducing the informal sector through proper registration of all those engaged in taxable activities’ 
(RRA, 2008, p. 3). 
 
The BMS was seen by the Authority to have been a major success, and in the years after its 
introduction led to quite dramatic increases in the numbers of small and medium sized taxpayers 
registered with the RRA.  The year before the BMS was introduced, there were 9662 registered 
small and medium taxpayers (RRA, 2007, p. 15).  The following year, this increased by 51% to 
14,580, of which 13,305 were small taxpayers and 1,275 were medium taxpayers (RRA, 2008, p. 14).  
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By 2010, there were 42,210 registered, a 337% increase from 2008 (RRA, 2010, p. 13).  Of these 
40,295 were small taxpayers and 1,715 were medium taxpayers.   
 
It is hard to argue that the actions of the RRA in extending the tax net into the informal sector 
were driven primarily by revenue imperatives.  Although the link between widening the tax base 
and increasing tax as a percentage of GDP is made by the RRA (RRA, 2010, p. 4), the actual 
revenue return for the significant investment of time and personnel resources is questionable.  
Firstly, the figures indicate that that of the 3,248 businesses surveyed in the first year of the BMS, 
only 754 (23%) of these were eligible to pay tax but not registered (RRA, 2008, p. 18).  
Furthermore, even when registered compliance rates among small taxpayers were relatively low, at 
54.4%.  This is unsurprising, given the low levels of literacy, and poor accounting practices usually 
found in the sector.  Finally, these are by definition small enterprises, with a limited taxable income.  
Taken cumulatively, it is not clear that adding a couple of thousand extra small, low compliance 
taxpayers would be worth, in revenue terms, the quite considerable transaction costs of finding and 
registering them.  It seems more plausible that extending state control into the informal sector was 
at least as strong a motivation. 
 
In contrast to Rwanda, the LRA has made no significant attempts to widen the tax net into the 
informal sector.  Although some organizations, such as Stockvels (rotating credit unions) have been 
targeted, there has been no systematic campaign comparable to the BMS in Rwanda.  Rather, small 
businesses, most of which are located in the informal sector, have largely been ignored by the LRA.  
They have not implemented a small business tax regime, such as those adopted in other countries 
which make it easier for small enterprises to pay tax by making the burdens of compliance easier 
and more affordablevi (FIAS, 2006b).  The LRA has left most small businesses out of the tax net. 
 
The reasons for this are, according to interviews with a senior LRA official, largely political.  
Targeting the informal sector would be deeply unpopular, as those in that category – the majority 
of the population – see themselves as ‘strugglers’vii.  The interviewee went so far as to say that no 
politician would allow the LRA to do this.  When probed as to whether extending the tax net into 
the informal sector might be desirable, despite political resistance, as part of a broader state-
building function, the official replied that this was not part of their mandate.  Although it is difficult 
to prove that the LRA has come under political pressure to avoid targeting the informal sector, it is 
clear that no political pressure has been applied to them to do so.  Without that pressure, and given 
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the low returns in additional revenue from any efforts, the LRA has been relatively inactive in its 
activities in relation to the informal sector. 
 
As well as the informal sector, there is a difference between the extent to which the RRA and LRA 
have tried to penetrate the periphery, beyond the capital and major urban areas.  The RRA has 
taken a number of steps in extending their reach into the provinces.  In 2004, coordinators were 
appointed for each province.  In 2005, provincial offices had their mandates extended so that they 
could carry out most of the services provided at headquarters in Kigali.  The same year they also 
carried out a study about how best the RRA could fit in with the new structures of local 
government, leading to the establishment of new offices in four regions.  In 2008, 2237 new 
taxpayers were added in the provinces, a third of the total that year.  This brought the total number 
of taxpayers to 13,861.  In 2009, the RRA took part in the training of local government 
administration on fiscal decentralization.  They have built a number of border posts, even though 
they have reduced collection from trade taxes, as part of the broader project of extending reach and 
consolidating control within and at the frontiers of the state. 
 
In contrast the activities undertaken by the LRA in extending their reach beyond the capital Maseru 
have been minimal.  They opened two new advice centres in Leribe and Mohale’s Hoek in 2005/6 
and they embarked on a project to refurbish border posts in 2007/8.  Other than these actions, 
there is little evidence of concerted attempts by the LRA to state-build in the periphery. 
 
In terms of enforcement, the RRA has been very proactive in putting in place auditing and 
enforcement mechanisms.  In the words of one expert, they see themselves as ‘the third force after 
police and army’viii.  Enforcement is seen as a critical means of improving direct tax collection: in 
the 2006 Annual Report the improved performance in direct tax collection is seen to ‘indicate 
improvements in the effectiveness of the tax administration through enforcement and audit 
activities, coupled with improvements in taxpayer identification, registration and education’ (RRA, 
2007, p. 18).  The introduction of Law 25 in 2005, strengthening enforcement procedures, enabled 
the RRA to develop its enforcement procedures.  This is reflected in the number of audits 
undertaken the following year – 746 (RRA 2007, 24).  They were in fact so tough on evasion that 
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning had to step in to restrain them on occasion (ADB 
2010) – showing that even in autocracies, the latitude for coercion is not limitless. The challenge, 
according to one expert, was to ‘turn a blunderbuss into a sniper’ix: to make enforcement 
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mechanisms more effective by targeting them more precisely.  By 2009, the number of audits had 
dropped to 333, but the number of prosecutions had risen (RRA, 2010, p. 14).   
 
The strenuous activities by the RRA in the area of enforcement contrast strongly with the rather 
lackluster efforts of the LRA.  In the initial years after its foundation, a tax amnesty was introduced, 
under which people could have their tax obligations for the preceding years dropped, if they 
became registered.  Eight hundred and fifty people applied, but the scheme was not deemed a 
success by external observers (FIAS, 2006b).  The use of more voluntaristic mechanisms, such as 
amnesties, signaled a less coercive attitude towards enforcement that is also reflected in the levels of 
auditing.  Although the annual reports do not detail year on year the number of audits, in 2005 the 
reports states that 132 businesses had been identified for audit.  It is not clear if this number of 
audits, much lower than that of the RRA, ever took place.  There was also lower visible 
commitment to ensuring the institutional infrastructure for prosecuting was in place: in 2004 the 
LRA expressed the hope that a Revenue Appeals Tribunal would be established (LRA, 2005, p. 20).  
As of December 2009 this tribunal had not been establishedx.   
 
Nowhere is the differing intensity with which the two authorities engage in state-building more 
clearly summed up than in relation to their activities with schools.  While the LRA has organized 
debating competitions around tax issues, offering a laptop as a prize, the RRA has begun working 
with the National Curriculum Development Centre to design a curriculum for secondary schools 
on entrepreneurship and taxation.  The RRA sees taxation not just as a means of collecting revenue, 
but also as a tool in the broader project of building the state and developing the nation.  The LRA 
has been far less fervent in its use of tax towards such ends.  They have instead shifted to seeing 
their role as being that of a service provider – to both taxpayers and the government – facilitating, 
rather than building the state.   
 
Tax Structure and Outcomes in Rwanda and Lesotho 
The imprint of the differences in operations detailed above can clearly be seen in the resultant tax 
structure and outcomes in both countries.  As Table Two demonstrates, Rwanda’s tax structure is 
very different to Lesotho’s and has changed significantly over time.  In Rwanda, where the RRA 
has specifically focused on direct and indirect taxes, widening the tax net, improving enforcement 
and increasing the reach of the state, these taxes constitute the main sources of tax revenue, and 
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dependence on trade taxes has diminished over time.  Rwanda’s main source of tax revenue is 
indirect taxes (47% in 2009), followed by direct taxes (35%).  The share of direct taxes in Rwanda 
has increased by 17% over the last six years.  This has compensated for the fall in trade taxes, which 
accounted for only 11% of overall revenue in 2009, down 42% from 2003.   
 
TABLE TWO:  TAX STRUCTURE IN RWANDA & LESOTHO, 2003-2009 
  Rwanda Lesotho 
Tax Type Indicator 2003              2009            % Change 2003               2009               % Change 
Direct % Tot. Rev 30                  35                  17 23                   21                       -9 
Indirect % Tot. Rev 50                  47                  -6  15                   14                       -7 
Trade % Tot. Rev 19                  11                -42 43                   57                      33 
Total Tax % GDP 12                  15                 25                  46                   63                      37 
Source: OECD’s database on African Fiscal Performance 
 
By contrast, in Lesotho, where the LRA has shied away from expanding the tax net and targeting 
politically sensitive sectors such as informal workers, trade taxes are the largest source of tax and 
dependence on them has increased over time.  Trade taxes constituted 57% of overall tax revenue 
in 2009.  This dependence has increased by 33% since 2003xi.  The share of both direct and indirect 
taxes has been falling since 2003, 9% and 7% respectively.   
 
To lend further weight to the proposition put forward here that it is democracy that has been 
driving these changes, Figure One shows trends in tax structure over a longer time period, from 
1996-2008.  As can be seen, Rwanda began with a high dependence on trade taxes but has been 
consistently reducing its reliance on trade taxes and increasing the share of direct taxes.  In Lesotho, 
the opposite has been the case, and this trend accelerated after the first fully free and fair elections 
in 2002.  As can be seen in the graph the upward trend in trade taxes and the downward trajectory 
of direct and indirect taxes began the year after the election in 2003. 
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FIGURE ONE: STRUCTURE OF TAXATION IN RWANDA & LESOTHO, 1996-2008 
 
 
  
The data illustrates two main points; that there is a difference between Rwanda and Lesotho in 
terms of tax structure; and that this difference has emerged recently, coinciding with changes in 
regime type.  Rwanda has been able to change the structure of taxation away from trade and 
towards direct and indirect taxes, while Lesotho has not.  Particularly since the introduction of 
democratic elections, Lesotho has reduced its share of direct and indirect taxes and become 
increasingly reliant on trade.  
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Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the reverse sequencing process that most developing countries are 
experiencing, democratizing before they have reached a point of substantial state consolidation, has 
important implications how they collect tax, and challenges our existing theories about the 
relationship between taxation and democracy.  As taxation in developing countries is primarily a 
function of state-building, and many aspects of state building are inherently coercive, democracy 
gives citizens the ability to resist, forcing states into lower intensity state-building activities, in the 
least politically divisive areas.  In the context of taxation, this means that it constrains the ability of 
the revenue authority to widen the tax net and consolidate its ability to coerce, focusing their 
attention instead on the least visible forms of taxation.  Democracies try to maximize taxation, with 
minimal state-building, while autocracies can maximize taxation, with maximum state-building.  The 
empirical case comparison shows how governments have incentivized revenue authorities into 
these modes of behavior, in ways that meaningfully impact on their daily operations.   
 
The limitations of this argument should be clearly articulated.  Firstly, this is an argument about the 
way in which regime type creates different levels of constraint on governments and state 
institutions.  It does not discuss in detail motivations, and the impact of regime orientation through 
this channel.  Just because autocracies can state-build more easily does not mean that they will, as 
most of post-Independence African history so clearly demonstrates.  Nor is it the case that 
democracies never work to overcome their constraints.  Although we have some theories about 
how regime type impacts on motivation, there is far more to say on this topic than can be 
accomplished within the scope of this article.  Secondly, emphasizing the importance of political 
constraints, should not come at the expense of the economic variables that matter, as the two are 
inherently interactive.  The prevailing economic structure will have a very big impact on where 
democracies seeking to maximize tax with minimal state-building will focus their attention.   
 
Nonetheless, there are a number of important implications stemming from the findings reported 
here.  The impact of reverse sequencing needs to be taken more seriously, not as a normative 
prescription but as an analytic reality with meaningful consequences.  If it is acknowledged that 
there are aspects of state-building that are inherently coercive, then it is clear that democracy in 
many ways can impede state-building tasks, such as bringing people within the tax net, by giving 
them a greater voice and ability to resist.  This negative relationship, the opposite of existing 
  24 
theories based on the West’s historical experience, underscores the uniqueness of that history, and 
the danger of assuming that the same ingredients in a different order, will lead to the same results.  
The paper echoes the emphasis on the importance of the formative stages of state-building for later 
outcomes, by showing how state institutions are, at least in their initial stages, somewhat malleable, 
and come to bear the imprint of the objectives of early governments in ways that may then become 
locked in and path dependent.  It is precisely for this reason that we need to think more 
questioningly about how democracy impacts on important state functions, like taxation, and adapt 
our theories to the context within which developing countries exist today. 
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i
 Even though indirect taxes are sometimes argued to be less visible, this is not the case in most developing countries, 
as it imposes heavy and visible administrative burdens on small businesses.  The introduction of VAT sparked protests 
in India, Uganda and Ghana (Moore 2007, 25). 
ii
 This is the last available data on employment structure for Rwanda.  It is likely that, although the broad proportions are 
the same today, the differences in level between Rwanda and Lesotho have decreased. 
iii
 It has to be admitted that the genocide in Rwanda makes it, in many ways, an exceptional case.  It has had a profound 
effect on subsequent political development, ethnic relations, and relations with the rest of the world (Hintjens, 2008).  
However, it is not clear that the genocide should be treated as a variable, in and of itself, so long as its effects through 
the channels of relevance to the main theoretical argument are acknowledged and controlled for, a comparative 
approach should be defensible.  
iv
 The size of the SACU remittance is the main factor accounting for Lesotho’s very high overall level of taxation, which 
is one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa.  However, the high levels of dependence on trade taxes which it creates is 
not exceptional, with trade taxes being the largest single category of trade taxes in most African countries. 
v
 Other African countries, including some democracies, also hold such days, Kenya being one example.  Again, the 
argument is not that all autocracies want to state-build and no democracies do, but rather that autocracy removes many 
of the constraints for doing so, while democracy maintains them.   
vi
 By means of, for example, having fewer annual filing deadlines for small businesses, or levying tax on presumptive 
rather than actual turnover.   
vii
 Interview with senior LRA official, 07/12/2009 
viii
 Interview with expert, 21/11/2009 
ix
Interview with expert, 21/11/2009  
x
 Here, as in a number of other areas, there is the suggestion that the LRA wants to be doing more, but is being held 
back from doing so.  As with the issue of funding, they often use the Annual Reports as a forum for publically expressing 
their position on certain matters.  They ask for a tribunal to be established, and they ask for auditors to be incentivized 
into completing quotas.  But, as on the funding issue, they often do not seem to be met, and the issue is dropped. 
xi
 As has been noted earlier, the Lesothan economy is heavily dependent on trade.  Although the higher level of trade in 
Lesotho may explain why the levels of trade taxes are higher than in Rwanda, it does not explain why this dependence 
has increased over time.  The argument in the paper is that this has been a deliberate choice of the government to 
focus on less politically sensitive taxes, and that, in the Lesothan context, trade is the most ‘lootable’ source of tax 
revenue.   
